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By Anna Gelpern1 
Contract standardisation serves many important functions in the sovereign debt 
market: among these, it saves time and money in preparing documents and endows 
widely-used terms with a shared public meaning, which in turn saves investors the 
costs of acquiring information, facilitates secondary market trading and reduces the 
scope for mistakes in the judicial interpretation of contract terms. Sovereign debt 
issuers and investors claim to value standardisation and list it as an important 
contractual objective. Issuers generally insist that their bond contracts are standard 
and reflect market practice. Variations from past practice and market norm must be 
explained in disclosure documents and through market outreach. Standardisation is 
not just part of the fabric of market expectations: international policy initiatives to 
prevent and manage financial crises rest on the assumption that sovereign debt 
contracts follow a generally accepted standard. Such initiatives would make no sense 
in the absence of standardisation. 
In fact, sovereign bond contracts are not nearly as standardised as market 
participants and policy makers seem to suggest. It is common to see a handful of 
negotiated terms embedded in a mish-mash of different generation industry models, 
sprinkled with bits of creative expression that no one can explain, usually attributed to 
some long-forgotten lawyers. At least some of the variation appears to be deliberate. 
However, to the extent that it is inadvertent, variation can be costly. For example, it 
can make contracts internally inconsistent, vulnerable to opportunistic lawsuits and 
errors of judicial interpretation. Variation could also make debt instruments less liquid, 
especially during periods of market stress. 
The problem of inadvertent variation would diminish substantially if sovereign debt 
markets were to adopt a more centralised, modular approach to contracting, whereby 
a subset of widely-used non-financial terms would be produced by an authoritative 
third party (a public, private, or public-private body) and incorporated by reference in 
individual transactions. Debtors and creditors would have to add party- and 
transaction-specific terms, and could still depart from centrally-produced default 
terms. However, any variation would be in a separate document, which would make it 
salient and thus easier to detect and evaluate than under the prevailing contract 
production regime. Market participants and the courts could rest assured that the 
terms purporting to be standard were in fact standard and that any departures from 
the standard were intentional and meaningful. Centralised production of standard 
terms would maximise the advantages of standardisation, amplify the signalling 
capacity of bespoke terms, facilitate the diffusion of optimal contract innovations 
across the sovereign debt market and reduce the legacy stock problem that has 
1  Professor, Georgetown Law and non-resident senior fellow at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for 
International Economics. I am grateful to the participants in the conference at the ECB and the University 
of Virginia Law School, and to Mitu Gulati, Angel Ubide, and Pierre Verdier for insights that contributed to 
this essay, and to Sebastian Röing for research assistance. 
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stumped policy makers and market participants2. Terms that have lost relevance 
through boilerplate iteration over time would be revised or culled more readily than 
they are today.3 
Centralised and modular contracting is not new in finance. Versions of the practice 
just described, where an industry group supplies core terms for contracts spanning 
an entire market, exist in foreign exchange and derivatives markets, as well as in 
trade finance.4 More distant analogues, where certain default terms are supplied by 
statute or treaty, are also common, especially in civil law systems.5 The Uniform 
Commercial Code, adopted by US states, and the UN Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods are among the examples from common-law 
jurisdictions. Most industry and statutory models of standardisation share three key 
features: central production of some terms, modularity (enabling combinations of 
customised and standard terms, selected from a menu)6 and a commitment to 
revision. 
In many ways, sovereign bonds are ideal candidates for centrally produced modular 
contracts. They tend to be actively traded, serve as price benchmarks for other 
borrowers and as collateral for other financial products, and are often favoured by 
regulated financial firms. Minimising information and transaction costs and errors of 
interpretation is especially important in such a market. 
The transition would not require a radical departure from current contracting practice. 
Sovereign debt contracting already has elements of modularity and centralisation. 
For instance, non-financial terms of domestic government debt are typically found in 
regulations; financial terms are announced at transaction time. External government 
debt commonly follows the practice of issuing multiple series of bonds with different 
financial terms pursuant to a single indenture or fiscal agency agreement, for 
example, under medium-term note (MTN) programmes and “shelf” registration filings 
with securities regulators. government debt management fora, financial industry 
associations and ad hoc groups of senior policy officials already issue non-binding 
guidance on sovereign debt contracts, invest in diffusing this guidance and 
coordinate ongoing reforms. 
For all these reasons, sovereign debt markets could plausibly achieve a higher 
degree of standardisation by switching to robustly centralised, modular contract 
production. Such reform would bring new political economy challenges. Sovereigns, 
2 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions 
in International Sovereign Bond Contracts (September 2015), available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf, pp. 9-10. 
3 Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate (November 25, 2016), Working Paper, available at: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2835681 
4 Boilerplate as a public good, and the case for contract production by trade groups and other nonprofits, 
are analysed in Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 Michigan 
Law Review 1075 (2006). 
5 See, for example, Claire A. Hill and Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with 
Fewer Words?, 79 Chicago-Kent Law Review 889 (2004). 
6 An extensive theoretical treatment of modularity in standard-form contracts is found in in Henry E. 
Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 University of Michigan Law 
Review 1175 (2006). 
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along with their public and private creditors, would have to agree on a body to draft 
and periodically update standard terms, coordinate their adoption, maybe even to 
issue authoritative interpretations. Sovereign governments, foreign and domestic 
creditors, civil society and international institutions would all have a stake in the 
outcome of this body’s work. If the centrally produced terms were to function as a 
strong default, their political salience would be high, raising barriers to coordination. 
Since sovereign debt markets are hierarchical and segmented both among issuers 
and investors, status and representation concerns would loom large. Finally, there 
would certainly be constituencies against change in any form, including lawyers and 
bankers in New York and London, who may have to give up influence and at least a 
portion of their fees, as well as those issuers and investors who would prefer to 
drown their idiosyncratic terms and arbitrage opportunities in the noise of apparently 
unintentional variation. 
Despite these caveats, moving to more robust standardisation makes sense for the 
foreign sovereign debt market, if not for sovereign debt in general. The remainder of 
this essay elaborates the argument. Part I defines standardisation and considers its 
benefits and costs in financial contracts. Part II discusses sovereign debt contract 
production, reform initiatives and the controversy over variation in the pari passu 
clause, which featured in recent sovereign debt litigation. Part III touches on 
statutory and judicial solutions to the problem of incomplete standardisation and 
elaborates an alternative solution, featuring centralised production of terms. Part IV 
outlines what centralised and modular contracts might look like in foreign sovereign 
debt and raises possible objections to such a contracting regime. I conclude by 
identifying the implications for research and policy. 
1 Why standardise? 
1.1 You know a term is standard when 
Classic law texts on contract standardisation treat standard (“boilerplate”) terms as if 
they were identical within the standard: at the extreme, comprising the same words 
in the same order, with the same punctuation.7 If the assumption is essentially 
correct, then even small variations in language must be presumed to be intentional 
and treated as meaningful by the parties and the courts.8 On the other hand, if the 
concept of “standard” allows some scope for variation without necessarily altering 
the effect of the contract term – perhaps as a matter of individual or firm drafting 
style, or local idiomatic usage – then the parties and the courts would have to first 
7  See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or 
the Economics of Boilerplate) Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Issue 4 (May 1997), pp. 713-770. 
8  See, for example, the following papers: Marcel Kahan and Shmuel Leshem, “Moral Hazard and 
Sovereign Debt: The Role of Contractual Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information,” Working Paper (29 
February 2016) available at: www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/moral_hazard_and_sovereign_debt.pdf 
and Mark C. Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1 (2014). 
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decide whether the words before them mean to convey a distinct meaning or merely 
express the same thing differently. 
Standard contracts, like standard terms, can also range from identical to broadly 
similar, or “of the same type.” For example, a standard consumer loan agreement 
might be entirely pre-printed, with only a few blanks to be completed at the closing 
by a bank clerk. A standard sovereign or corporate bond might contain a customary 
set of terms arranged in the usual order; however, not all terms are found in all bond 
contracts, some terms might come in several distinct yet standard “flavours,” while 
other term types might permit a measure of variation within an accepted range. Thus 
two bonds might contain very different negative pledge clauses, yet both clauses 
would be considered standard - provided the standard comprises several 
alternatives, or permits variation - and, as a consequence, the bonds would be 
considered standard as well. 
Some terms or variations are found only in bonds of a particular credit quality, or in a 
certain geographic region. The resulting contract is standard for its type, for example, 
an emerging market sovereign bond issued in London, or a Latin American corporate 
bond issued in New York. 
Investors might take a checklist approach to contract analysis, asking simply whether 
a term type is present in the contract: is there a negative pledge clause? 9They might 
also ask whether the term itself is “standard,” meaning whether it follows one of the 
accepted conventions for the relevant market. If enough of the customary terms are 
present and standard, the contract would be treated as standard. Only rarely would 
the investor parse the wording of a term to assess whether it departs from the 
standard and thus represents a risk or an arbitrage opportunity. 
1.2 Benefits 
Standard-form contracts are ubiquitous; their advantages in lowering transaction 
costs and conveying information are well-rehearsed.10 These advantages are 
especially pronounced in financial contracts among sophisticated parties. This 
subsection provides a very brief summary. 
Standardised contracts are quicker and easier to produce. Reproducing and 
customising standard forms saves research, drafting and negotiation costs over 
generating text from scratch. Contract counterparties may pay less to service 
providers and middlemen, such as lawyers and investment bankers arranging the 
transaction. Even if it did not produce cost savings overall, standardisation can help 
deploy the resources allocated to contract production more efficiently. This is 
because the time and energy that might have been spent drafting and analysing 
                                                                    
9  For example, Bloomberg offers a bond-level covenant checklist as part of its fixed-income portfolio 
management toolkit. If a bond contains one of the listed covenants, the word “Yes” appears opposite 
the covenant name. The screen contains no further information on the nature and content of the 
covenant, which only makes sense if all covenants that go by the same name have the same 
substantive effect. 
10  See, for example, Klausner and Kahan, supra footnote 7, for a good overview. 
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frequently-used terms can now be devoted to novel and transaction-specific 
challenges. As an additional benefit, compressing the transaction preparation period 
allows issuers and investors to take advantage of time-sensitive market 
opportunities. 
Widespread, repeated use imbues standard terms with a meaning shared among the 
relevant market participants. This has multiple important implications for financial 
contracts. Shared meaning reduces the cost of information acquisition in secondary 
market trading. Buyers and sellers who know that a bond contract is standard do not 
need to research its meaning before deciding whether to trade it. Conversely, 
variation becomes more salient against a background of standard terms. The 
combination of a strong standard and deliberate, easily discernible variation in 
contract terms makes it easier to convey information - for example, to signal 
willingness or ability to repay. 
Standard terms with shared meaning can become important tools in coordinating 
market-wide response to shocks and other contingencies. Contracts can effectively 
codify market practices and spur the development of institutional infrastructure, for 
example, to guide the parties through early termination and substitute performance, 
procedures for interest rate and exchange rate calculation, as well as notice, 
payment and settlement mechanics. If a dispute over the meaning of a standard term 
goes to court, the existence of a shared meaning can save adjudication costs and 
help avoid interpretation error. Judges can (and generally must) presume that the 
parties used standard terms in standard ways, which are easier to access than the 
parties’ idiosyncratic, subjective meanings.11 
1.3 Costs 
The downsides of standardisation, like its advantages, are related to its coordination 
properties. For example, if all contracts provide for the same response to 
counterparty financial distress, or to drastic exchange rate depreciation, standard-
form contracts can amplify financial contagion: all market participants might rush to 
sell at the same time.12 Furthermore, standardisation can raise the cost of individual 
judicial errors even if it were to reduce the overall incidence of such errors. When a 
standard term is misunderstood and misapplied by a court, the immediate effect is 
market-wide, potentially triggering a different form of contagion. 
The risk of judicial misconstruction is particularly high when old boilerplate terms 
remain in standard-form contracts despite losing all or most of their practical 
relevance. Such contractual “black holes”13 are ripe for exploitation by enterprising 
litigators, who can convince a court to fill them with new meaning and potentially 
11  For an influential framing of judicial treatment of standard and customised terms, see Charles J. Goetz 
and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express 
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 California Law Review 261 (1985). 
12  See, for example, Erik F. Gerding, Contract as Pattern Language, 88 Washington Law Review 1323 
(2013). 
13  Choi, Gulati and Scott, supra footnote 3. 
The importance of being standard 28 
trigger a market shock. On the other hand, standard terms can become self-
perpetuating and impede the very sort of innovation that might avoid or correct 
judicial mistakes, or improve procedures to deal with crises. 
A host of collective action problems may stand in the way of changing standard 
terms for the better. A new term might be costly to design but easy to replicate, 
dissuading potential first movers from investing resources they would find hard to 
recoup. Debtors may resist deviating from the standard for fear of sending a negative 
signal to the market.14 A novel term, even one designed to correct an earlier judicial 
misunderstanding, can be misconstrued by a court; in any event, its meaning may 
not be settled for some time.15 A contract containing the new term may be less liquid 
for as long as traders are unsure of its meaning, or how it fits into the institutional 
ecosystem that developed around the old boilerplate. Debtors and creditors may also 
delegate the task of updating their standard-form contracts to outside law firms, 
which come with their own organisational barriers to innovation.16 
In sum, contract standardisation has many benefits, but also comes with costs, 
including a tendency to amplify contagion from interpretive and other shocks and to 
stunt optimal innovation. I consider these benefits and costs in the context of foreign 
sovereign bonds in Part II. Part of the challenge with these bonds is the apparent 
lack of consensus on the sort of standardisation that should prevail in any given case 
- identical words/identical effect, or different words/identical effect - and whether
sovereign debtors, their creditors, their citizens and other stakeholders in fact
understand and intend the type of standardisation they are getting.
2 Are sovereign bond contracts standard? 
2.1 Contract form and contract production 
At the highest level of generality, there are two kinds of sovereign bond contracts: 
domestic and foreign. Most sovereign debt belongs in the former category; it is 
issued under the debtors’ own law and in their domestic markets. Domestic 
sovereign bond terms vary considerably across countries, reflecting local legal and 
market idiosyncrasies. Within each sovereign’s domestic debt stock, non-financial 
terms tend to be consistent: they are not negotiated from issue to issue, but are 
typically published in government regulations. Foreign sovereign debt - here, debt 
issued under foreign law, usually outside the borrower’s jurisdiction - tends to adopt 
14  Why change the negative pledge clause unless you plan to pledge? Why provide for a restructuring 
process if you do not plan to restructure? 
15  See, for example, Goetz and Scott, supra footnote 11. 
16  See, for example, Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction Boilerplate 
and the Limits of Contract Design, University of Chicago Press, 2013; Barak D. Richman, Contracts 
Meet Henry Ford, 40 Hofstra Law Review, 77 (2011).  
The importance of being standard 29 
the contracting customs of its chosen law market.17 New York and English law 
dominate this category and are the focus for the remainder of this essay; however, 
German, Japanese and Swiss law contracts, among others, have been important for 
some sovereigns. 
New York and English law sovereign debt securities are issued under a contract that 
describes the relationship between the debtor and the securities holders, including 
the holders’ rights vis-à-vis one another and the sovereign. This contract – a trust 
indenture (New York), a trust deed (London), or a fiscal agency agreement – 
contains the core non-financial debt terms and may append a form of the security or 
securities to be issued. It has become common for sovereign borrowers to issue 
multiple series of securities under a single trust document or fiscal agency 
agreement, which contemplates a range of financial terms to be spelled out in future 
supplemental agreements. Figure 1 illustrates: 
Figure 1 
Sovereign bond contract architecture 
 
 
There is a modular, hub-and-spokes quality to this contract. Non-financial terms, 
which range from ministerial to substantively significant (notably including waiver of 
immunity, governing law, status, payment, events of default and modification 
procedures) are agreed with the sovereign’s investment bankers and produced by 
outside counsel, all paid by the issuer. Although parts of the negotiation and drafting 
process have become compressed with the advent of word processing and other 
                                                                    
17  The practice is not uniform. For example, scholars have documented a handful of instances of 
sovereign bonds issued in London under New York law, using English-law drafting conventions. See, 
for example, Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York 
Law Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers, 35 Georgetown Journal of International Law 815 (Summer 2004). 
Trust or fiscal agency agreement
definitions
representations and warranties
covenants (incl. Status)
events of default
modification
choice of law
notices, etc.
5 yr USD 
supplement
10 yr EUR 
supplement3 yr floating-rate 
supplement
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technologies, it entails substantial individual input and personal interaction, that is to 
say real people haggling over words.18 Once settled, core non-financial terms stay 
unchanged for years, as the sovereign periodically sells securities with maturities 
between one and thirty years under the same contract.19 On the other hand, 
transaction-specific terms, such as principal and interest, term structure, currency, 
indexation, and others that directly determine payments due under the contract, 
might change whenever the sovereign goes to market, while incorporating the core 
by reference. Normally, neither the core nor the transaction-specific terms are 
negotiated with individual primary market investors; however, investment bankers 
managing the offering are supposed to keep up with market sentiment and solicit 
investors’ views to ensure a successful distribution. Potential future buyers of 
distressed bonds in the secondary market, who tend to be quite specialised and do 
not normally participate in primary offerings, have even fewer ways of conveying 
their contract preferences. 
Core non-financial terms in sovereign debt contracts exhibit a remarkable degree of 
continuity on the one hand, with functionally similar terms and even some of the 
same words appearing in 19th, 20th and 21st century bonds. They exhibit an equally 
remarkable degree of variation among terms in contemporary contracts that purport 
to be functionally similar, if not identical. 
2.2 A case study in variation: the pari passu clause 
While there is no comprehensive study of non-financial term variation in sovereign 
bonds, some contract provisions have been the subject of exhaustive studies. 
Foremost among these is the pari passu (equal step) clause, typically found under 
the heading “Status,” which has appeared with slight variations in sovereign bond 
contracts since at least the 19th century. The most prominent contemporary 
variations of the clause are set forth below: 
• Version 1 
The Securities are general, direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and unsecured 
obligations of [the sovereign] … and [the sovereign] shall ensure that its obligations 
hereunder shall rank pari passu among themselves and with all of its other present 
and future unsecured and unsubordinated [external debt] … (used by Belize in 2013 
under New York law) 
                                                                    
18  See, for example, Gulati and Scott, supra footnote 16. 
19  For example, Kazakhstan issued ten- and thirty-year securities under its new MTN Programme in 2014, 
after a long period out of the market. See, for example, Moody's Investors Service, Rating Action: 
Moody's assigns provisional senior unsecured (P)Baa2 rating to Kazakhstan's $10 billion MTN 
programme (8 October 2014) (also announcing ratings for the first two eurobonds issued under the 
programme).  
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• Version 2 
[Version 1] + The payment obligations of [the sovereign] under the Securities shall at 
all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and 
unsubordinated [external debt]. (used by Argentina in 1994 under New York law) 
• Version 3 
[Version 2] + … save only for such obligations as may be preferred by mandatory 
provisions of applicable law. (used by Ukraine in 2012 under English law) 
• Version 4 
The Securities are the direct, unconditional and general and … unsecured 
obligations of [the sovereign] and will rank equally with all other evidences of 
indebtedness issued in accordance with [this agreement] and with all other 
unsecured and unsubordinated general obligations of [the sovereign] for money 
borrowed. … Amounts payable in respect of principal of (and interest on) the 
Securities will be charged upon and be payable out of the [sovereign treasury], 
equally and ratably with all other amounts so charged and amounts payable in 
respect of all other general loan obligations of [the sovereign]. (used by Italy in 2003 
under New York law) 
The pari passu clause in sovereign bonds has attracted tremendous market, policy 
and academic attention since 2000, when an Elliott Associates investment fund 
holding defaulted Peruvian debt got a Brussels commercial court to rule in its favour 
based on contract language similar to Version 2 above, which mentions “payment 
obligations.” The court decided that Peru breached an obligation to pay its creditors 
equally and enjoined Euroclear from processing payments to the holders of Peru’s 
restructured debt until Elliott was paid in full.20 Peru quickly settled and Elliott 
recouped several times its investment. 
More than a decade later, US Federal courts in New York reached the same 
conclusion in a lawsuit against Argentina by a different Elliott affiliate, again using 
Version 2 of the clause. The courts ruled against Argentina despite interventions by 
the US Executive and the governments of Brazil, France and Mexico, among others, 
each of which insisted that the pari passu clause, including Version 2, could not be 
construed to require full payment to the holdouts. Argentina initially refused to settle. 
Court injunctions blocked the government from servicing $29 billion of restructured 
debt, as well as from issuing new debt targeting foreign investors. 
Leaving aside the merits of Belgian and US court decisions as a matter of law, they 
presented a policy conundrum. On the bright side, they paved the way to a new, 
potentially generalisable method of enforcing sovereign debt. A sovereign that 
sought to make a credible contractual commitment to repay could do so now by 
adopting Version 2 of the pari passu clause, construed by the courts to require 
rateable payment to holdouts and backed by the courts’ injunctive power. Adopting 
                                                                    
20  Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of 
Brussels, 8th Chamber, 26 September 2000). 
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Version 4 of the clause, which conveys an even clearer commitment to pay, would 
have a similar effect. On the dark side, enforcement would come at a very high cost 
to the borrowing country, with potentially significant externalities. Breaching either 
Version 2 or Version 4 of the clause could bring about a financial boycott of the 
sovereign, starving the country of foreign exchange and cutting it off from trade. If 
the sovereign attempted to pay despite the injunction, court sanctions could disrupt 
systemically important payment and settlement systems, all in the name of full 
payment for a small minority of enterprising holdouts. 
After its courts ruled in favour of the holdouts in lawsuits against Peru and 
Nicaragua, Belgium quickly enacted a statute shielding Euroclear from injunctions.21 
Soon after, a court in London declined to interpret the pari passu clause in the 
Congo’s debt contracts, recognising that third parties would bear the brunt of any 
injunctions blocking payments to sovereigns.22 Together, Belgian legislation and 
judicial reticence in the United Kingdom reduced the policy salience of the pari passu 
clause in the euromarkets. After pari passu reoccupied centre stage as a debt 
enforcement tool in New York in 2011, the options for managing its impact shrank 
dramatically. The Supreme Court effectively foreclosed the judicial path for the time 
being, when it refused to review lower court injunctions. Belgian-style legislation had 
no prospect in the United States. For those who worried about pari passu and its 
spillover effects on the international financial system, contract reform was all that 
was left. 
2.3 Boilerplate shock and boilerplate reform 
US federal courts in New York were under the impression that Argentina’s version of 
the pari passu clause was unusual. Researchers found otherwise: 
                                                                    
21  For the decision against Nicaragua, later overturned on unrelated grounds, see Republic of Nicaragua 
v. LNC Investments and Euroclear Bank S.A., Docket No. 240/03 (Brussels Commercial Ct. 11 
September 2003). For a description of the statute, see Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de 
Belgique, Financial Stability Review 2005, pp. 162-163. 
22  “This point is, I think, closely allied to the seventh point, which concerns the nature of the relief sought 
generally, which is directed towards the coercion of third parties rather than securing immediate 
compliance by the defendant. Because I regard this last point as determinative, I regard it as 
unnecessary to attempt any analysis of the pari passu clause. In any event, with all respect to 
Cresswell J, who did not have the advantage of the observations of the amicus which have been made 
to me, that question would be better addressed in a debate as between the original parties to an 
agreement in which the clause appears and, moreover, in a case where the party seeking to enforce 
the clause does not derive its title in substantial part from original parties who have already colluded in 
its apparent breach.” Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo, 2002 No. 1088, [2003] EWHC 2331 
(Comm) (Commercial Ct. 16 April 2003). 
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Figure 2 
Pari passu clause variations 
 
Source: Weidemaier et al. 2013 
Since the revival of the foreign sovereign bond market in the 1990s, a growing 
number of sovereigns had chosen the “payment” version of the clause (Version 2), 
which made them vulnerable to injunctions in the aftermath of the Peru and 
Argentina rulings. The classic Version 1 of the clause, which promised equal ranking 
without reference to payment, seemed insulated from enforcement injunctions until 
another US court, responding to a copycat complaint against Grenada in 2013, left 
open the possibility that even a simple promise to rank pari passu might be read as 
supporting an injunction.23 More recently, researchers have identified a separate 
category of contracts (labelled Version 3 in the typology above), which on the one 
hand use the vulnerable “payment” wording, but also apparently allow the debtor to 
pass a mandatory domestic law preferring its other payment obligations. Ukraine 
enacted just such a law in 2015, in an attempt to neutralise its Version 3 pari passu 
clause.24 Finally, there was a noticeable if small contingent of Version 4 clauses, 
which promised rateable payment in no uncertain terms. On the whole, the growing 
prevalence of Version 2 clauses, along with the many variations on the pari passu 
theme unearthed in the wake of recent lawsuits, has sown confusion about the 
nature and effect of standardisation in sovereign bond contracts and the precise 
nature and scope of the threat to the system from pari passu. 
                                                                    
23  The court refused to dismiss the case and ordered it to proceed to trial on the assumption (albeit for the 
sake of argument) that Grenada’s Version 1 clause was “similar” to Argentina’s Version 2 clause, see 
Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, Opinion and Order, 13 Civ. 1350 (HB) (SDNY) 
(19 August 2013), p. 5, see http://www.creditslips.org/files/grenada.districtcourtdecision081913.pdf. The 
case was settled without a definitive ruling on the meaning of Grenada’s Version 1 clause. 
24  No court has construed a Version 3 clause to date. 
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Beginning in 2012, an informal working group25 of policy officials, debt managers, 
market participants, lawyers and academics considered options for revising the pari 
passu clause, as well as majority modification CACs, in foreign sovereign bonds.26 
The group’s work culminated in the release of new model clauses by the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA), endorsed by the Group of 20 and 
the IMF.27 The new pari passu clause reads as follows: 
• Version 5 (ICMA Clause) 
The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and 
rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with all other 
unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding, 
provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable 
payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in 
particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same 
time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa. 
The new model clause, which reflected several rounds of consultation with market 
participants, combined the simple ranking formulation of the old pari passu clause 
(Version 1) with an express disavowal of the rateable payment interpretation that had 
supported injunctions against Argentina and Peru. The disavowal stripped pari passu 
of its recently-acquired powers; however, the range of sovereign misdeeds it 
proscribed was vanishingly narrow, most likely limited to domestic laws subordinating 
the creditors.28 
2.4 The Un-Boilerplate 
The reformulated pari passu clause was incorporated in ICMA’s Primary Market 
Handbook, a guidance document addressed to its membership, which includes most 
major financial market participants, including issuers, buy-side and sell-side 
investors. Although members are expected to follow the guidance, it is a relatively 
soft coordination device: the model clause language is seen as a public good; it is 
neither strictly mandatory, nor rigorously policed.29 The IMF similarly does not 
mandate the inclusion of particular language in its sovereign members’ contracts; it 
                                                                    
25  The author of this essay participated in the working group. 
26  See, for example, Mark Sobel, Strengthening collective action clauses: catalysing change—the back 
story, Capital Markets Law Journal (2016) 11 (1): 3-11 first published online January 11, 2016, and 
Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller and Brad Setser, "Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses 
in Sovereign Bonds" in Martin Guzman, Jose Antonio Ocampo and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Too Little, Too 
Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia 2016). 
27  See, for example, Sobel, supra footnote 26. 
28  The argument for the narrow reading is articulated in, for example, Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. 
Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 Emory Law Journal 870 (2004) and 
Phillip Wood, Pari Passu Clauses – What do they Mean? 18 Butterworths Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 371 (2003) 
29  Compare Davis, supra footnote 4. The handbook is available at: http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-
Policy-and-Market-Practice/Primary-Markets/ipma-handbook-home/ 
The importance of being standard 35 
merely recommends the inclusion of terms (such as ICMA clauses) that would have 
the desired policy effect.30 
Nonetheless, the entire coordination effort that brought about Version 5 of the pari 
passu clause was premised on a high degree of contract standardisation. The goals 
of reducing uncertainty and containing the spillover effects of pari passu as an 
enforcement tool would hardly be advanced if sovereigns and their creditors all 
varied significantly from the model clause, leaving future courts to sort out the mix of 
common standard and idiosyncratic meaning they sought to convey. Yet variation is 
precisely what happened immediately following the release of ICMA’s version of pari 
passu in August 2014. The examples below illustrate: 
• Ghana (September 2014, English law) 
The Notes constitute direct, unconditional and … unsecured obligations of the 
Issuer and … rank and will rank pari passu, without any preference among 
themselves and with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated 
obligations of the Issuer, save only for such obligations as may be 
preferred by mandatory provisions of applicable law, provided, however, 
that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at 
any time with respect to any such other unsecured and unsubordinated 
obligations of the Issuer and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other 
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Issuer at the same time or as 
a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa. 
• Kazakhstan (November 2014, English law) 
The Notes will at all times rank pari passu without preference among 
themselves and at least pari passu in right of payment, with all other 
unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer from time to time outstanding, 
provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or 
rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to the Notes or any other External 
Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External 
Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the 
Notes and vice versa. 
• Vietnam (November 2014, New York law) 
The Notes shall at all times rank without any preference among themselves and 
equally with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated 
External Indebtedness … provided, however, consistent with similar 
provisions in the Government’s other External Indebtedness, that this 
provision shall not be construed so as to oblige the Government to effect 
equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other 
External Indebtedness and, in particular, it shall not be construed so as to 
                                                                    
30  See, for example, IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action 
Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Staff Report and Press Release, October 2014) available 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf, and Chanda DeLong and Nikita Aggarwal, 
Strengthening the contractual framework for sovereign debt restructuring—the IMF’s perspective, 
Capital Markets Law Journal (2016) 11 (1): 25-37 first published online January 11, 2016. 
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oblige the Government to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or 
as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa. 
• Mexico (November 2014, New York law) 
The debt securities rank and will rank without any preference among 
themselves and equally with all other unsubordinated public external 
indebtedness of Mexico. It is understood that this provision shall not be 
construed so as to require Mexico to make payments under the debt securities 
ratably with payments being made under any other public external 
indebtedness. 
Each of the above “early adopter” clauses includes the central innovation of ICMA’s 
model, the disavowal of rateable payment; each might be sensibly classified as a 
“Version 5” clause. However, Ghana combines the Version 5 disavowal with 
additional flexibility to enact domestic laws subordinating the bondholders, also in 
Version 3. Kazakhstan’s Version 5 incorporates a reference to payment, echoing 
Version 2, which had prompted the latest contract reform effort. Vietnam’s and 
Mexico’s clause replaces the Latin “pari passu” with the English term “equally,” and 
appears to address the disavowal of rateable payment to the courts (“shall not be 
construed”). Vietnam moreover tries to extend the disavowal to its outstanding debt, 
which did not explicitly reject the rateable payment meaning. 
What to make of this variation? It is easy enough to find an explanation for each of 
the early adopter clauses: some lawyers combined ICMA’s model with their clients’ 
old boilerplate; others sought to reconcile the language drafted by ICMA’s English 
lawyers with local market conventions, in effect proposing a distinct-but-consistent 
New York standard.31 Some or all might have thought that their phrasing was more 
elegant, or did a better job of protecting their clients on the margins. In public, 
everyone claimed that their clause followed ICMA recommendations endorsed by the 
IMF and that any variation from the model was non-substantive. This was quite 
unsettling in the wake of recent sovereign debt lawsuits, which showed, if anything, 
that variation as such posed a risk. Reigning in variation that turned out to be 
problematic ex post was an important objective for the public-private collaboration 
that yielded ICMA’s model pari passu clause. 
Even if one found ICMA’s model clunky, or worse, internally inconsistent for 
promising equal treatment except when it really mattered, the model had the 
advantage of industry and public sector backing, along with well-publicised, 
accessible drafter’s intent.32 Years from now, a court construing early variations on 
ICMA’s model pari passu clause would be hard-pressed to conclude that any of them 
were non-substantive, a product of mindless copying.33 After all, these had to be 
among the most carefully considered pari passu clauses of all time. Pari passu had 
                                                                    
31  ICMA formally introduced the New York model in May 2015. See 
http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/ 
32  See, for example, Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute 104 Michigan Law Review 
1129 (2006) (addressing the problem of discerning the parties’ intent in boilerplate terms) and Davis, 
supra footnote 4. 
33  See, for example, Gugiatti and Richards, supra footnote 17. 
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been the focus of policy and market attention for three years leading up to their 
production. The lawyers, bankers and officials responsible for contract design either 
participated in working group efforts directly, engaged in consultations or were 
targeted in outreach efforts early on. As a result, a future court might well conclude 
that any early adopter who chose to depart from the model did so deliberately, to 
achieve an objective distinct from that of the model. If this were not the result debtors 
and creditors had intended, perhaps their lawyers did not do their jobs: variation 
might indicate a persistent agency problem.34 An investor mindful of this prospect 
would see a wealth of arbitrage opportunities. 
Another challenge arises from the way in which contracts are revised. Sovereigns 
typically do not update their outstanding contracts and only incorporate innovations 
in new issue documentation. IMF staff estimated that, when the ICMA released the 
latest model pari passu clause, the stock of foreign sovereign bonds outstanding was 
approximately $900 billion, of which 71% would mature within a decade.35 Even if all 
new bonds adopted ICMA model clauses, it would take over a decade for the entire 
stock to transition to the new standard. Until then, reformed and unreformed 
contracts, each “standard” for its time, would trade in parallel. If bond market 
participants viewed the old bond contracts as structurally senior or subordinate to the 
new, the result would be a fragmented, stratified debt stock vulnerable to 
opportunistic intervention. 
2.5 Whither sovereign debt contracts? 
The pari passu episode, which began with a Belgian court ruling against Peru and 
ended (for now) with the introduction of ICMA clauses, highlighted several features of 
contracting in the foreign sovereign debt market. First, the market has at least two 
distinct and widely used standards – English law and New York law – which claim to 
achieve the same goals with different combinations of words. 
Second, each of the two standards permits a degree of variation, including borrowing 
from one another, which the drafters (rightly or wrongly) describe as non-substantive. 
Apparently routine departures from the standard are almost never tested in court; 
when they are, some pose a real risk of divergent interpretation and market 
disruption. The risk of disruption is highest when there is no compelling evidence of 
market usage to give a contract term contemporary meaning.36 Doctrinally, it must 
mean something – in practice, it could mean anything. The “payment” version of the 
pari passu clause used by Peru and Argentina, which eminent lawyers had described 
as functionally equivalent to the “ranking” version, is a case in point. 
The third feature of sovereign debt contracting is its apparent susceptibility to 
coordination by public and private actors. The production of ICMA model third-
generation CACs and pari passu clauses in 2014 and 2015 is only the latest 
                                                                    
34  See, for example, Gulati and Scott, supra footnote 16. 
35  IMF, supra footnote 29, p. 33. 
36  See, for example, Choi, Gulati and Scott, supra footnote 3. 
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example of such coordination. From 2010 to 2013, European debt officials managed 
the adoption of second-generation CACs in euro area government bonds, 
implementing their governments’ commitment in the Treaty establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism.37 That initiative was styled as a successor to an 
earlier drafting effort under the auspices of the Group of Ten from 2002 to 2003, 
which led to the adoption of first-generation CACs in New York-law bonds issued by 
emerging market governments, as well as in European foreign sovereign bonds - 
and the first recommendation concerning CACs in the ICMA handbook.38 ICMA’s 
predecessors in the London market, along with a handful of industry groups in New 
York and Washington, engaged with the official sector for almost a decade leading 
up to the 2003 reform. In the early 1990s, bankers and officials worked closely 
together to design the Brady Bonds, which became the preferred vehicle for 
restructuring sovereign debt to banks. The Emerging Market Traders Association 
(EMTA) almost immediately began producing market practice and trading 
documentation for these bonds, helping to spur a sovereign bond market revival after 
half a century of inactivity.39 The experience of the League of Nations Committee for 
the Study of International Loan Contracts in the 1930s, responding to an earlier wave 
of sovereign defaults, suggests that the roots of coordination and public-private 
collaboration in sovereign debt contracting run extremely deep, even if the results fall 
short of the stated objectives.40 
3 A more standard standard 
3.1 Room for improvement 
Fallout from the latest pari passu episode suggests that the sovereign debt market 
could benefit from more robust contract standardisation. Pervasive minor variations 
make it hard for market participants and the courts to distinguish between lawyerly 
noise and deliberate customisation. Investors tempted to consider bond contracts 
solely through the prism of a yes/no covenant checklist might end up with treasure or 
unexploded ordnance in their vaults.41  
Debtors and their investment bankers are reluctant to change bond contracts to 
improve crisis management, which most describe as a remote contingency, for fear 
of sending a negative signal and raising their cost of borrowing. On the rare 
                                                                    
37  See, for example, the following documents available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-
3_en.htm and http://europa.eu/efc/collective-action-clauses-euro-area_en 
38  See, for example, the following documents available at: http://europa.eu/efc/collective-action-clauses-
euro-area_en and http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/Primary-
Markets/primary-market-topics/collective-action-clauses/ 
39  See, for example: http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=58 
40  The committee was active between 1935 and 1939. It mobilised experts from the financial industry, 
lawyers, academics, and government officials, and produced a report recommending changes in 
sovereign debt documentation and practice. League of Nations Report of the Committee for the Study 
of International Loan Contracts, Geneva (1939). 
41  Knowing that a bond has a pari passu clause or a CAC is close to meaningless without knowing what 
kind of pari passu clause and what kind of CAC it contains. 
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occasions when contracts do change, the large stock of legacy bonds detracts from 
the benefits of innovation and creates opportunities for abuse. Paradoxically, policy 
interventions to reform sovereign bond contracts to limit the cost of financial crises 
appear to be premised on a far greater degree of standardisation than that which 
prevails in the market. In some cases, reform initiatives open the gates of innovation 
only to amplify the range of variation.42 
Two broad approaches have been proposed to deal with aspects of this problem in 
relation to sovereign debt. The first is a sovereign bankruptcy treaty, which would 
override a subset of sovereign bond contract terms in a crisis, and facilitate a 
restructuring. The treaty would have to reflect a global consensus on topics such as 
the meaning of equal treatment, and chart an intelligible a roadmap for 
restructuring.43 It could be drafted to apply to the old contracts and deal with the 
problem of outstanding stock. At the other extreme, scholars have recently proposed 
giving judges the ability to declare a standard term meaningless when presented 
with compelling evidence that it has lost content from decades of rote repetition and 
random, acontextual variation.44 This approach could also address the outstanding 
stock problem, albeit in a more limited, ad hoc fashion. 
A third possibility might combine contract, statute and interpretation in a single 
institutional mechanism. The derivatives industry offers an example. 
3.2 Contract as market 
The global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market is organised around a 
common contract produced and copyrighted by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), which underpins transactions referencing close to 
$500 trillion in notional amounts outstanding.45 The ISDA master agreement 
functions as the hub for contract modules that, together with the master agreement, 
make up a derivatives contract. These include relationship-specific schedules and 
annexes negotiated among market participants. Product-specific sets of definitions 
correspond to particular types of transactions, such as interest rate, equity, or credit 
default swaps. Transaction-specific confirmations contain the relevant financial terms 
and incorporate the master agreement, the schedules and any other relevant parts of 
the contract apparatus by reference. In the example depicted in Figure 3, the darkly-
shaded modules are transaction-specific, the medium-shaded module is relationship-
specific and the unshaded modules are standardised. The entire structure, 
comprising all transactions across a bilateral relationship, constitutes a single 
                                                                    
42  See, for example, Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, Innovation after the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign 
Bond Contracts Since 2003, Capital Markets Law Journal 4 (no. 1): 85–103. 
43  For a recent overview of the debate, see, for example, 41 Yale Journal of International Law, Special 
Edition on Sovereign Debt (2016). 
44  Choi, Gulati and Scott, supra footnote 3. 
45  Notional amounts outstanding. The Bank for International Settlements OTC derivatives statistics up to 
the first half of 2016 are available at: www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm (Table D5). 
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contract, enabling the counterparties to manage the relationship on a portfolio 
basis.46 
Figure 3 
Derivatives contract architecture – an illustration 
 
 
Robust standardisation need not mean enforced uniformity. In Figure 3, the parties 
are free to customise, so long as they do so in designated places – schedules and 
confirmations – which makes departures from the standard easier to spot and to 
analyse (and, as many commentators have noted, creates a barrier to variation). 
This structure also offers a partial solution to the outstanding stock problem in 
contract reform. The ISDA protocol process, first used in 1998 in as part of the 
transition to European economic and monetary union, gives members the option of 
acceding to a common document (a protocol) amending the master agreement. 
ISDA posts the protocol on its website and keeps a tally of adherents. Once two 
members have agreed to adhere to a common protocol, they have effectively 
amended their bilateral contracts to reflect the new terms.47 Protocols reduce the 
need for bilateral negotiations, while reassuring market participants that the 
amendment in fact reflects industry preference. The solution to the stock problem is 
only partial, however, since when a new generation master agreement comes out, 
transactions governed by the old master agreement do not move to the new 
standard. 
ISDA started out as a dealers’ group in the 1980s, responding to demand for a 
common “vocabulary” in the transatlantic derivatives market. Although it is still 
                                                                    
46  For an accessible overview of the ISDA contract architecture, see GuyLaine Charles, The ISDA Master 
Agreement, Part I: Architecture, Risk, and Compliance, Practical Compliance and Risk Management for 
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Part II: Negotiated Provisions, Practical Compliance and Risk Management for the Securities Industry 
(May-June 2012). 
47  ISDA’s description of the protocol process, “About ISDA Protocols” is available at: 
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-protocols/ 
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dominated by large financial institutions, the group has expanded its membership 
over time to include smaller funds, non-financial companies that use derivatives for 
risk management, and service providers. It has also sought to ensure that its 
contracts are enforceable around the world. ISDA’s contracts are drafted by outside 
lawyers and in-house staff, working under the auspices of ISDA’s documentation 
committee. The committee has thousands of members, although only a small subset 
participate actively. The same actors decide when a new master agreement or a new 
set of definitions might be needed to address a new product, responding to 
regulatory or market developments. 
Since its inception, ISDA’s work has expanded beyond contract drafting, to other 
areas of market practice, infrastructure, contract interpretation and private 
adjudication. Owing to the transnational reach of its contracts, their widespread 
adoption and high degree of standardisation, ISDA has become an indispensable 
intermediary between market participants, governments and international regulatory 
fora, projecting quasi-statutory power across its market. For example, in 2012, it 
worked with policy makers to minimise market disruption from the Greek debt 
restructuring,48 while in 2014 and 2015, it published protocols to facilitate market-
wide recognition of national laws for resolving large cross-border financial 
institutions, the result of intense collaboration with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and regulators in major financial jurisdictions.49 
ISDA may be the best known instance of centralised, modular contracting in the 
financial industry, but it is not unique. For example, the foreign exchange market, 
with its daily turnover exceeding $5 trillion,50 also uses a structure comprising 
standard-form master agreements, schedules, definitions and procedures, for foreign 
exchange and currency options transactions. The contracts are drafted by financial 
industry lawyers working with major foreign exchange market participants. In the 
United States, the drafters are part of the Financial Market Lawyers Group, 
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The financial firms are 
represented by regional trade associations.51 Like the push to standardise 
derivatives documentation, centralised production of standard-form foreign exchange 
contracts began in the 1980s; in both cases, standardisation gets much credit for the 
explosive market growth. 
More distant analogues go back to the interwar period in the first half of the 20th 
century, and include initiatives such as the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credit (UCP) in trade finance that grew out of international banks’ 
                                                                    
48  See, for example, Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 European Business Organisations 
Law Review 347 (2012).  
49  See, for example, David Geen, Seth Grosshandler, Katherine Hughes, Igor Kleyman, Knox L. McIlwain, 
Samantha Riley, and M. Benjamin Snodgrass, A Step Closer to Ending Too-Big-to-Fail: The ISDA 2014 
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Law of Investment and Risk Management Products 35:3 (April 2015), and 
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ISDA, supra footnote 46. 
50  BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign exchange turnover in April 2016 (September 2016, updated 
December 11, 2016) available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16fx.pdf  
51  Financial Markets Lawyers Group, Documentation: FXC Master Agreements, available at: 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/fmlg/documentation/master.html 
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attempt to coordinate their practices with respect to documentary letters of credit. 
UCP is produced under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) Banking Commission, which now also publishes practice documents in other 
areas of trade finance, oversees their revision and issues authoritative 
interpretations.52 
In all these examples, financial industry members came together to produce a set of 
contract terms, which were then adopted wholesale, with limited variation, across the 
target market. The industry body took responsibility for the ongoing revision of 
standard terms and, increasingly, for their interpretation, which has elicited deference 
from the courts.53 Over time, the industry body engaged in repeated instances of 
collaboration with governments and international organisations. Standard-form 
contracts became the basis for more elaborate interweaving and institutionalisation 
of policy and market practice even in the absence of treaties or statutes. The next 
part considers whether such a model might be suitable for the foreign sovereign debt 
market. 
4 Who is afraid of sovereign boilerplate? 
It would not take much to map ISDA’s modular contract design illustrated in Figure 3 
onto the existing foreign sovereign bond contract structure in Figure 1. An industry 
body such as ICMA, perhaps in collaboration with a public institution such as the IMF 
or the FSB, and a rotating complement of sovereign debt managers and their 
lawyers, could draft the core non-financial terms of a New York trust indenture or 
English trust deed, including representations, covenants and events of default. The 
standard form might offer a menu of options for some terms, and make other terms 
optional. The draft would be released for a period of public consultation, including 
market and civil society outreach, on the administrative law model. At the conclusion 
of the consultation process, the result would be posted on a dedicated website along 
with any public comments received as part of the process. Sovereign borrowers 
would then incorporate the resulting terms by reference in future transactions, with 
customised terms confined to separate schedules. 
The drafting group would meet regularly, say, twice a year, to consider recent 
developments and the potential need to revise or augment the standard form. 
Additional extraordinary meetings might be called in response to events that require 
prompt contract adaptation. Proposed revisions would be issued in a protocol, so 
that they might operate retroactively among any debtors and creditors who agreed to 
adhere to them. To minimise the legacy stock problem and the associated free-riding 
opportunities, the initial agreement could stipulate that protocols winning the 
                                                                    
52  See, for example, Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of 
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 Yale Journal of International Law 125 (2005). UCP underwent its 
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53  Levit, supra footnote 52. 
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adherence of a specified majority of outstanding bond holders affected by the 
proposed revision would bind all the remaining holders as well. 
Such an approach to sovereign bond contracting would help ensure that standard 
portions of the contract are in fact standard and vetted by the relevant stakeholders, 
adding an element of public accountability that is mostly missing today. It would 
expressly acknowledge variations within the standard and highlight deviations from 
the standard. It would also facilitate ongoing collective revision of the terms, although 
it would also dampen individual initiative. To counter the tendency to boilerplate 
ossification and encourage culling, the drafting group could get standing authority to 
initiate revisions following regular reviews. Over time, the group may issue 
authoritative interpretations of its standard terms and articulate best practices with 
respect to disclosure, debtor-creditor engagement, and other process matters.54 
What is not to like in such an approach? 
Although the centralised and modular contract production could have important 
advantages over the status quo, it would also pose new challenges. First, there is 
the matter of constituting the drafting group. It is implausible and undesirable for 
sovereign borrowers simply to delegate their debt contracts to a private industry 
body comprising large financial firms, or even to other governments. On the other 
hand, a drafting committee comprising all sovereign governments borrowing in the 
international markets under foreign law would be unwieldy. Rotating the membership 
in a way that ensures balanced representation from different regions and income 
groups may be acceptable to most sovereigns, but political sensitivities would 
remain.  
Market participants would face representation challenges of their own: most existing 
industry bodies tend to skew in favour of the largest financial firms, which have more 
bargaining power and greater capacity to dedicate personnel to industry business. 
Distressed debt investors and others who normally eschew primary offerings, have 
no direct input in contract terms for the time being; market participants disagree on 
the extent to which secondary market prices convey such investors’ views regarding 
contract terms. In the new drafting process, funds known for aggressive enforcement 
tactics would probably insist on being included; however, their contract preferences 
might well differ from those of the larger and more passive investors, who dominate 
primary markets today. 
Second and related, decision-making rules would represent another hurdle: anything 
other than consensus would be controversial, but consensus might be unachievable. 
For example, the existence of a newly robust standard form contract, and the 
resulting presumption that any deviation from it is meaningful, could make deviation 
more costly. Countries that fear penalties for deviation might block agreement on a 
standard they dislike, raising the barrier to innovation higher for everyone. 
                                                                    
54  The existing Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Debt Restructuring, initiated by the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), the Principles for Sovereign Lending and Borrowing and Sovereign 
Restructuring issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN 
General Assembly resolutions on sovereign debt restructuring, as well as ICMA’s latest disclosure 
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Third, the new contracts would have to account for existing and future market 
segmentation. For example, it is generally understood, though rarely acknowledged 
in public, that sovereigns with different credit ratings may have different foreign bond 
contracts. At the moment, much of this segmentation in contract drafting is relatively 
subtle and easy to hide in the din of apparently random variation. This also makes it 
easier for countries to change their contracts below the radar screen as they move 
up and down the credit ladder. A centralised drafting effort might produce different 
standards for different market segments, for example, by geographic region, credit 
quality, currency, or governing law, effectively forcing countries to classify 
themselves, a politically fraught outcome. It could also choose to issue a single 
standard and leave market segmentation to the schedules, where differences 
attributable to hierarchical factors could be muted more easily. An overly large menu 
of standards, or a single standard contemplating substantial variation in the 
schedules, would detract from the goal of robust standardisation, although neither is 
likely to be fatal to the overall effort. 
Fourth, there is the matter of getting sovereign governments to follow through on 
their commitments to standardise. No one can force a country to adopt a particular 
contract term or contracting process, a challenge evident in the IMF’s soft-touch 
approach to endorsing ICMA clauses and its predecessors. However, to the extent 
that new, centrally-produced terms would be accepted as the market standard, 
sovereigns might come under pressure from their investors to adopt such terms. 
Clearing and payment systems might also make access conditional on the adoption 
of the terms. Favourable treatment of centrally-produced contracts under bank, 
insurance, asset management and pension fund regulations would make them more 
liquid, creating additional adoption incentives. 
Fifth, an attempt to centralise contract production could face opposition from the 
lawyers and bankers who currently produce sovereign bond contracts and are rather 
protective of their creative output. Even if such objections all amounted to rent-
seeking, they would be hard to ignore, especially since the new regime would want 
to harness these actors’ expertise and documentation archives. On the bright side, 
lawyers active in the sovereign debt market are a relatively small community, 
comprising a few dozen lawyers, mostly within large firms. It is quite possible that all 
or most would find a role in negotiating relationship- and transaction-specific terms 
for existing clients and also participate in the group drafting effort. 
Finally, it is quite possible that the current, very incomplete standardisation in fact 
reflects the preferences of sovereign borrowers and their creditors. Most sovereigns 
issuing bonds abroad under foreign law may well prefer a world where contracts are 
ambiguous and noisy, even though they harbour latent risks of the sort that 
materialised in the case of Argentina. Modern-day reform initiatives to introduce 
CACs and change the pari passu clause tried hard to mute any signal from contract 
change. On the other hand, the average investor may prefer to trade contracts that 
are “standard enough,” so that in most cases, careful analysis of the terms does not 
pay off. The small minority investing based on a thorough reading of the contract 
may be only too happy to keep the arbitrage opportunity to itself. 
The importance of being standard 45 
The foregoing objections are illustrative. The broad concern is that, in exchange for 
greater standardisation and more “statute-like” contracts, the sovereign debt market 
would find itself struggling with new and thorny political economy challenges. 
Centralised contract production would reallocate transactional and governance 
resources; it would empower some actors and constrain others. It is hard to tell in the 
abstract whether the trade-off would be an improvement on balance. That judgment 
would depend on specific institutional features of the new regime, and the resulting 
balance between stability and innovation, broad-based representation and individual 
initiative, among others. 
Conclusions 
Recent litigation and contract reform initiatives in the foreign sovereign debt market 
highlight the risks of haphazard, incomplete standardisation. While deliberate 
variation in contract terms can convey information, save borrowing costs and 
improve the parties’ capacity to deal with contingencies, it is far from certain that 
existing variation is either deliberate or optimal.  
Further research into the nature and extent of variation in sovereign bond terms 
beyond CACs and the pari passu clause would help diagnose the extent of the 
problem. It would also help identify how many distinct, more-or-less internally 
coherent documentation standards exist in the foreign sovereign debt market, so that 
parties’ claims that their contracts are standard for one market segment and 
functionally equivalent to another, could be verified. Ascertaining the market standard 
or standards should inform the decision to proceed with more robust standardisation. 
Pending further research, it makes sense to take sovereign borrowers and their 
creditors at their word: if robust standardisation is an important contracting objective, 
the sovereign bond market can get much closer to it with just a few relatively modest 
steps. Harnessing existing coordination mechanisms and contracting practices in the 
market, sovereigns and other stakeholders could, at a minimum, produce a standard 
set of core non-financial terms to be incorporated by reference in their transactions. 
Governance would present the biggest obstacle to standardisation on this model. 
Nonetheless, the centralised, modular contract alternative is worth a try given the 
risks embedded in the current regime and the difficulty of implementing statutory 
solutions. If debtors and creditors reject it, maybe they do not want to be standard 
after all.
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